

International Boundary Digest: Eurasia

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A Research Paper

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by Office of Global Issues, with contributions from analysts in the Geographic Issues Division, OGI, and from CPAS. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Geographic Issues Division, OGI

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Preface	
Information available as of 30 November 1988 was used in this report.	
was usea in this report.	The boundary information is categorized for ease of use,
	particularly by the current intelligence officer, when fast-breaking border incidents occur and charges and countercharges relating to border issues are made:
	• Border Basics. Description of the border's length, status of demarcation, and its physical and cultural characteristics.
•	• Significant Developments. Summary of related issues as they affect political relationships.
	• Frontier History. Review of the history of the frontier and the diplomatic evolution of the boundary.
	• Current Developments and Outlook. Assessment of current border issues and prospects for their resolution.
	Other border factors—economic value or potential, ethnic mix, population pressures—are also noted as they pertain to border issues. A chronology of
	important dates affecting boundary status is included, and key boundary references are cited. A map, or maps, accompanies each boundary
	discussed to highlight the disputed sectors and territory and to illustrate
	other factors and relationships.
	Maritime boundary disputes involving nearby islands or coastal features related to boundary controversies also are included in the Digest. This
	publication, however, omits the more than 300 continental shelf and other maritime boundaries, many yet to be delimited, between the world's 139
,	coastal states and discussion of other types of maritime boundary and jurisdictional conflicts.
	Background
	Disputes over international boundaries are a common cause of international tension and conflict. Almost half of the world's nations share land
	boundaries that are disputed. In addition, disputes are sometimes revived

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	over boundaries long settled, particularly where regional political alignments are fluid and internal political conditions change rapidly. Boundary	*
	issues are a major foreign policy concern of the United States. Disputes be- tween nations friendly to the United States present sticky diplomatic dilemmas in that each party to the dispute will at some point exert pressure	•
	on Washington to support its view of the issue.	25)
	Fixed, geographically precise international boundaries are a recent development in international relations. Although ancient political entities—	
	nomadic groups, tribes, and kingdoms—recognized geographical limits to their authority and control, these limits were usually vague and shifting,	
	and located in distant and lightly populated frontier zones. Ancient borders often followed easily recognized physical features, such as mountain	
	ranges, deserts, and swamps; sometimes rivers served to separate different ethnic groups. Some states, however, built walls, or other physical barriers to define limits of control, regulate trade, and control the movement of	
	people and the establishment of settlements.	25)
	Modern international boundaries marked with pillars, cleared strips, and other physical means of identification accompanied the evolution of the	
	nation-state system in Europe that commenced in the late 17th century. Advances in mathematics, geodesy, surveying techniques, and cartography	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	permitted states to compile reliable maps of their territory and to more accurately draw their boundaries. New nations were born, colonies were	
	established, and older nations that relied on distant buffer zones for their borders gradually were forced or chose to define their boundaries with	
	greater precision. Increasing population pressures and the need for more land led to the settlement of frontier lands and the necessity to establish definite state limits.	0E\
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	Boundary disputes originate from a variety of causes and for different reasons. The degree of national passion and emotion aroused over a	•
et e	boundary-territorial dispute is often wildly disproportionate to the size and value of the area disputed. Occasionally, international boundaries, long settled by treaty and demorphise are used as a protect.	š -
	settled by treaty and demarcated, are used as a pretext—citing alleged violations or "incidents"—to publicize deep-seated quarrels between states	

and to inflame public opinion.

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4.	Types of Boundary Disputes	
	 The list of causes of border disputes is lengthy, but, in general, there are three major situations that lead to disagreement: Disputes arising from the boundary marking itself, usually in the interpretation of details and the lack of precise geographic data. Disputes as the consequence of territorial and economic expansionism. Boundary problems created from state succession and the desire to renegotiate old boundary treaties. 	25 X 1
	In all boundary disputes the political-military strength of the state and domestic politics have as much or more to do with the raising (or perhaps reviving) of boundary-territorial questions than the legality and justification for boundary adjustment. Once a dispute is aired and a nation presents its case publicly, all types of evidence—good, bad, and irrelevant—are used to convince other states of the justice of the particular nation's claim. Occasionally, disputes will be settled without rancor, but more often they sputter along for years, even decades. Still others may go to a third country or an international tribunal for arbitration and settlement, and at times armed conflict helps settle the issue.	25X1
	For example, the Argentina-Chile boundary originally was delimited on the assumption that the line of high peaks coincided with the watershed. Later exploration revealed that the watershed was well east of the line of highest peaks. Controversy over this and a later dispute over which stream was the headwater stream that affected the boundary had to be resolved through British arbitration.	25X1
3	Colonial boundaries defined by the European powers in the Americas, Africa, and much of Asia from the 16th through the 19th centuries were often hastily drawn and without benefit of detailed knowledge of the terrain. This lack of precision frequently led to later disputes over the boundary when the compilation of more accurate maps revealed the errors.	
	In some cases, colonial boundaries were drawn so as to keep intact homogeneous ethnic and economic areas, but this was more an exception than a rule.	25 X 1
	The creation of new states, particularly in excolonial territories, frequently is a cause of border problems. New states often attempt to redress old	

grievances and improve their internal political standing through threats or acts of belligerence against neighboring states. This may lead to the revival of ancient claims and the demand to renegotiate old boundary treaties

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Boundary Terms

Terms used in boundary disputes and boundary making possess special meanings that are often ignored or misapplied in press reports and in the speeches of national leaders when referring to border problems. Some of the more common terms and definitions are:

- Boundary. A line that marks the limits within which the state exercises its sovereign rights.
- Border. Border is often used as a synonym for boundary, but the term has a more generalized meaning of area or territory close to or in proximity to the actual line of separation on the ground between the states. The term border zone and borderlands suggest the areal elasticity of the word. See frontier.
- Delimitation. The determination of where a boundary should be drawn through the use of verbal description, usually in a treaty or similar diplomatic proceedings. The verbal description varies as to detail but contains sufficient references to physical features—midline of a river, a watershed, a mountain crest—and to specific points identified by geographical coordinates to permit a joint team of surveyors and technicians to demarcate the boundary on the ground. A map showing the agreed delimitation line usually is appended to the agreement.
- Demarcation. The act of marking a boundary on the ground, as defined in the treaty or other document, by means of pillars, monuments, or other types of markers. Demarcation teams provided for in the treaty usually make or update ground surveys of the local topography. The end product is a more detailed point-to-point description of the boundary (markers are numbered or lettered consecutively) that is combined with one or more large-scale maps showing the exact alignment and individual markers. To be binding, the proceedings, resulting from the team's work and issued as a protocol or annex to the original treaty, must be signed by each nation.

- Frontier. A zone or area, usually of considerable length and breadth, that indicates the approximate limits of political authority. No exact limit is set to a frontier until a boundary agreement is reached and the boundary is demarcated on the ground. The term frontier to denote a nation's outward territories is not a synonym for the term boundary.
- Thalweg. The middle of a river channel, or its principal channel where more than one exists, of navigable streams that form an international boundary. Recent international law holds that the thalweg is the boundary in navigable rivers, failing any special agreement to the contrary. A thalweg boundary may divide the river into two very unequal parts. The thalweg also may change because of flooding and other natural causes. Nations usually have an agreement to resolve boundary questions when rivers shift their courses. In nonnavigable streams, international boundaries are usually defined by median lines. Detailed maps delineating the riverine boundaries are a standard part of the boundary documentations.
- Territorial sea. A belt of sea and underlying seabed and subsoil adjacent to the coast where the coastal state is sovereign. The sovereignty extends to the airspace over the territorial sea. Under international law, the maximum breadth of the territorial seas is 12 nautical miles (the US claims a 3-nautical-mile breadth) from the baseline. In the territorial sea, ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage, and in international straits, ships and aircraft have the rights of nonsuspendable transit passage.

•	Continental shelf. As defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on
	the Law of the Sea, a nation's continental shelf comprises the seabed and
	subsoil seaward of the territorial sea extending to the outer edge of the
	continental margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
	baseline, whichever is greater.

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	Introduction Disputes over international boundaries have been a major cause of conflict in Eurasia. Before 1945, European territorial disputes produced numerous alterations in the political map; since 1945, boundary issues have been a major source of conflict in Asia	border areas, and the placing of boundary markers. When the colonial powers relinquished their possessions or were forced to withdraw in the years immediately following World War II, the emergence of an independent India and a reunified China created new power alignments and rivalries. One result was a reassessment of many European-imposed boundaries.	25X
	In Asia post-1945 political realignments and economic developments have helped fuel dispute and conflict over boundary and territorial issues. These issues reflect both ancient political rivalries and a more recent legacy of colonial boundaries imposed by Western nations.	No significant territorial disputes or boundary changes have occurred in Western Europe since the end of World War II, as ancient quarrels over religious, ethnic, and nationalistic issues have been either resolved or subordinated to other political or economic goals. Border controls between West Euro-	25X 25X
	The most serious disputes involve China and the USSR, and their neighbors. The Soviet obsession with border security—much of its land border is protected by elaborate security measures—carries over in its	pean nations have been largely abolished. In Eastern Europe, however, several sizable territorial adjust- ments were made after World War II. The long period of Soviet-enforced political stability has sup-	

negotiations and disputes with bordering states.

tions change.

China's historical preeminence in Asian affairs and its concept of state relations—an elaborate system of buffer states and tributary relationships—collapsed in the mid-19th century from European political and economic pressures. After colonies were established around the rim of Asia, the traditional system of vaguely defined borders was replaced by the European system of formal boundary treaties, the mapping of

pressed ethnic and nationalist tensions—particularly in the Balkans-that might reemerge to spark future territorial disagreements should present political rela-

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
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
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Afghanistan-Pakistan

Border Basics

The Afghanistan-Pakistan boundary extends northeast-southwest from the high peaks of the Hindu Kush, at the China trijunction, to the Iranian trijunction located in the Baluchistan desert. The 2,430-kilometer-long border was defined in a treaty (1893) between Great Britain and Afghanistan. The border, often termed the Durand Line after the chief British negotiator, was surveyed and much of it demarcated between 1894 and 1896.

The boundary follows a variety of terrain features. mostly barren hills and mountains. The northernmost section of the boundary coincides with the high ridges and peaks of the Hindu Kush that for several hundred kilometers presents a formidable and highly visible barrier. South of the Khyber Pass, the boundary is aligned to follow watersheds, prominent landmarks, ridgelines, and sometimes a river or ravine; across the Baluchistan desert, the boundary primarily consists of straight line segments connecting fixed points. South of 34° N, or roughly the southern twothirds of the boundary, demarcation teams placed 332 markers when the boundary was initially demarcated. One section of the border, between 34° N and 36° N, remained in dispute until 1919, after which some sections, though not all, were demarcated.

The boundary divided an extensive but ill-defined region that was homeland to a mix of tribal groups and clans, primarily because many groups moved seasonally in search of grazing, or for purposes of trade, employment, and visiting kin. Some groups for example, moved from high mountain pastures in central Afghanistan to winter quarters in Pakistan's low valleys and plains. Inevitably, the boundary split the homelands of some groups between Afghanistan and British-administered (later Pakistani) territory. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, large numbers of refugees also have fled Afghanistan, and many remain in the borderlands inside Pakistan.

Significant Developments

The issues of the border and Pushtunistan have been put aside in the aftermath of the 1979 Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan and the continuing insurgency. A possible clue to future treatment of the Pushtunistan issue was the issuance in 1982 of an official map of Afghanistan in which the usual designation of a sizable area inside Pakistan as part of "Pushtunistan" was omitted.

Frontier History

The Afghanistan-Pakistan boundary was a result of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia during the 19th century. British advances north of the Indus River into the mountainous borderlands encircling Afghanistan were designed to counter growing Russian advances and influence that, in London's view, threatened British interests in the Indian subcontinent. Although Britain gradually established ties toand some tenuous control over—the turbulent tribal territory, the threat of raiding and plundering tribesmen remained. In 1893 a British delegation, headed by Sir Mortimer Durand, was sent to Kabul to discuss with the Amir of Afghanistan several territorial questions, one of which was defining a boundary to separate Afghan and British territory. Because the Amir wanted to limit any additional British advance northward, negotiations began promptly that resulted in the 1893 border treaty.

The treaty boundary was traced on a small and unreliable map, and field parties authorized to fix the boundary on the ground discovered numerous places where map and treaty descriptions failed to jibe with ground truth. Although British negotiators generally made concessions to Afghanistan in interpreting the intent of the treaty, any line chosen inevitably divided some clan and tribal territories. The most important result was the division of the more than 10 million Pushtuns between two states, even though a fixed boundary had little meaning to many Pushtun tribes, who seasonally moved from place to place. The general northeast-southwest alignment of the border was also athwart ancient routes—used by warriors as well as traders and seasonal migrants—from the highlands

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of Central Asia into the fertile Indus valley. Later agreements confirmed the boundary alignment. A dispute of the alignment of the border near the Khyber Pass was resolved with partial demarcation in 1919 and confirmed by treaty in 1921. A number of local border adjustments were made through 1932.

The border issue remained quiet until the establishment of the state of Pakistan in 1947. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan wooed tribal leaders (rulers of princely states and other areas not under direct British administration had a choice at the time of partition) of the Northwest Frontier Agency (now North-West Frontier Province), who chose, however, to accede to Pakistan. At the same time a movement for an independent state—Pushtunistan—was given support by Afghanistan, which was angered over Britain's failure to consult Kabul over the future status of the tribal territories. Afghanistan was the only state to oppose Pakistan's entry into the United Nations, and in 1949 the Afghan parliament voted to repudiate the Durand Line.

Afghanistan advanced several reasons in support of its Pushtunistan claim, including irredentist claims based on former Afghan rule (1747-1823), that the boundary treaty was signed under duress, that the tribal territory remained "independent" after the border was established, and that Pakistan could not inherit the rights of a former state. Pakistan's responses then and later have ranged from denial that a problem existed to charges of Afghan interference in the internal affairs of another state.

The Pushtunistan issue, never completely dormant, flared with particular intensity in the periods 1950-51, 1955, 1960-61, and 1978. The crises nearly always started with Afghan charges of mistreatment by Pakistan of the Pushtuns within its border. Sometimes border clashes would occur. Pakistan frequently closed the border, alleging transit violations, thus blocking vital trade routes to landlocked Afghanistan, in an attempt to exert pressure. Some crises led to third-party intervention in attempts to mediate the dispute. The crises were characterized by sensationalized press accounts and the trading of exaggerated

charges. A major beneficiary of the disputes, particularly those involving border closures, was the Soviet Union, whose offers of alternative routes and aid strengthened Moscow's position within the country.

Current Developments and Outlook

Since 1979 the Pushtunistan and the Durand Line issues have been subsumed by the Soviet military occupation and Afghan resistance. Talks begun (1982) under UN auspices—involving Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and, indirectly, the USSR—have focused on troop withdrawal, noninterference, international guarantees, and refugees.

Political stability in Afghanistan and a resolution of the refugee problem are presumed prerequisites to any future Afghan-Pakistani discussion of Pushtunistan and the Durand Line. Although the concept of Pushtunistan has been used for three decades by Afghan leaders because of its wide political appeal, the practicalities involved if rhetoric became reality suggest a different resolution. The amorphous limits of a Pushtunistan state—at times expanded to include Baluchistan—and the lack of Afghan fervor to include the Afghan Pushtuns within it are suggestive of the lack of economic, political, and practical viability of Pushtunistan. During the 1970s some slight lessening of Afghan intensity on the issue was observed.

Pakistan seems unlikely to change its views on maintaining the status quo, in view of US recognition through one public statement (1956) and private assurances of Pakistani sovereignty up to the Durand Line. There are, however, good reasons, based on the mutual benefits of a better marked and more easily controlled boundary, to work toward eventual border talks whose primary purpose would be a resurvey and redemarcation of the boundary. A "new" boundary based on the present alignment but re-marked and with minor adjustments, could also remove the term Durand Line and its emotional connotations of past injustices.

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Border Treaties and Key Dates

1747-1834

Durrani Empire (Afghanistan) controls area now part of Pakistan's northwest frontier.

1893

Border treaty is signed between Afghanistan and Great Britain, which termed Durand Line, following gradual British advances into mountainous borderlands north and west of the Indus.

1894-96

Joint border commissions survey and demarcate southern two-thirds of the boundary. Line fixed on ground differs in many places from treaty map and description.

1921

Treaty between Afghanistan and Great Britain, following 1919 Anglo-Afghan war, confirms delimitation and demarcation (1919) of parts of the boundary near the Khyber Pass.

1947

British India is partitioned; state of Pakistan is established. Leaders of tribal territories located between Afghanistan and Pakistan opt to accede to Pakistan. Some tribal leaders initiate issue of Pushtunistan.

1949

Afghanistan's parliament repudiates Durand Line; Pakistan's Foreign Minister states that boundary is not a question for discussion.

1950-51

Border tensions and incidents increase; traffic restrictions are placed on Afghanistan's transit trade.

1955

Diplomatic relations are broken (resumed in 1957) over Pakistan's planned administrative changes in borderlands; border incidents arise and third-country mediation efforts are made.

1960-61

Afghan-Pakistani talks fail; major military action; border is closed to transit traffic; mediation efforts are made.

1963

Shah of Iran's mediation efforts result in restoration of diplomatic relations and reopening of border.

1973

Pushtunistan issue is revived and brief series of incidents and actions ensue, although less severe than in past crises.

1979

Soviets intervene militarily in Afghanistan; earlier, Afghanistan calls for self-determination of border groups, including Baluchi. Border tensions are aggravated by increased refugee flow from Afghanistan.

Discussions under UN auspices (USSR, Afghanistan,

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
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China-India

Border Basics

The China-India border, about 3,380 kilometers long, extends east from the Karakoram Pass to the trijunction with Burma. The boundary is customarily divided into western, central (or middle), and eastern sections for discussion purposes in negotiations; between the middle and eastern sections are the Himalayan states of Nepal and Bhutan. The boundary has not been demarcated, and only the eastern section has a treaty basis (the validity of which is disputed by China). The territorial differences between the Chinese and Indian versions are substantial, amounting to about 129,000 square kilometers.

The western section of the boundary (1,640 kilometers) is the present line of control and approximates China's current claim. This defacto boundary extends south from the Karakoram Pass and connects a series of high peaks (upwards to 6,500 meters) that in part mark a minor water divide. In places, the Chinese claim line cuts across the headwaters of streams flowing west and south into the Indus River system. About 250 kilometers to the south, the line converges with India's version of the boundary near the river.

In contrast, India's version of the boundary in the western section extends the boundary northeast from the Karakoram Pass until the line intersects the crest of the Kunlun Mountains. The high peaks of the Kunluns are followed for about 100 kilometers. At this point India's claim line turns to the southeast and crosses extremely high plateau and basin terrain before reaching a range of mountains immediately east of the Indus valley, where the Indian and Chinese claims coincide. The disputed territory, between 33,000 and 37,000 square kilometers in area and roughly triangular in shape, is termed northeastern Ladakh by India; in the northeastern quadrant is the Aksai Chin (Aksaygin) basin (a name sometimes applied to the entire disputed territory). Most of the disputed territory is physically a westward extension of the Plateau of Tibet and is characterized by barren plains and basins, mostly at elevations of over 5,000 meters.

Until the Chinese road construction in the 1950s, and the subsequent military buildup by India and China in the border area, the region had no permanent population and was seldom visited because of the scant forage and limited supplies of potable water. The meager cultural influences are mainly Tibetan.

The central sector of the China-India border (640 kilometers long) extends approximately northwest-southeast from Ladakh to Nepal. The boundary follows major water divides, and key border points are the major cross-border passes at elevations of 5,000 to 5,500 meters. The highest peaks (up to 7,600 meters) of the Great Himalaya Range lie about 50 kilometers south and west of the water divide. Traditionally, the border area was only seasonally occupied by Bhotias—a professional trading clan of mixed Tibetan culture that wintered in India, then spent the summer months engaged in trade in western Xizang.

The eastern section of the boundary (1,140 kilometers) extends from Bhutan to Burma and generally coincides with the highest peaks and passes marking the watershed between major river systems in India and Xizang. In some places, however, rivers have their headwaters north of the boundary in southern Xizang. The alignment of the boundary (the McMahon Line) was defined on a map accompanying the 1914 Simla Agreement, attended by representatives of Great Britain, China, and Tibet. China's version of the border, however, is a line drawn far to the south. approximately following the break between the foothills and the plains. An exception is the eastern end of the line where China's alignment of the border follows river valleys and ridges before its intersection with the Burma boundary. In dispute are about 90,000 square kilometers consisting of the rugged, mostly forested hills and mountains of the eastern Himalayas. Most of the numerous hill tribes that inhabit this area are ethnically and culturally distinct from the Tibetans and the Indians.

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
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Significant Developments

Sino-Indian relations slowly warmed during the 1970s, leading to a visit to Beijing by Indian Foreign Minister Vajayee in 1979. In December 1981 the first of several border negotiation sessions was held. Early sessions made little progress, but later meetings led to Chinese acceptance of having discussions (though not settlement) proceed on a sector-by-sector basis. At the sixth round, held in New Delhi (November 1985), substantive talks began concerning the eastern sector. A Chinese proposal that India make territorial concessions in the eastern boundary sector raised a formidable obstacle to progress, particularly since it caught Indian negotiations by surprise. No progress was reported during the seventh round of talks (July 1986), in part because of the earlier (June) establishment of a Chinese military post in disputed territory along the McMahon Line.

In February 1987, India changed the status of the area on its side of the McMahon Line from an agency (North East Frontier Agency) to a state (Arunachal Pradesh). China rejected the move. The eighth round of the border talks in November 1987 produced no breakthroughs, but the atmosphere was termed "positive." In June 1988 the two sides agreed in principle to resume trade across Tibet, which has been suspended since 1962, and in September agreed for Prime Minister Gandhi to visit Beijing in December 1988, the first such visit since 1960.

Frontier History

The origins of the differing versions of China-India border alignment are rooted in ancient claims and post-1950 politics. Common factors in the dispute include:

- Poor, and sometimes inaccurate, maps were used in early discussions (late 19th and early 20th century) of the border, leading to misconceptions as to the lay of the land.
- The western and central sections of the borderlands were essentially uninhabited or populated only seasonally, thus requiring no civil administration.
- British frontier policy was based in part on fear of potential Russian influence and political dominance in western China.
- The border area was extremely difficult to reach (and to defend) until recently, and traditional communication links were animal caravan routes and footpaths.

•	Not until after 1950 did either India or China	begin
	to extend administrative control and establish	mili-
	tary posts in the border areas.	

During the late 19th century, British officials were unsure as to where to draw the northern limits of India. One view, based on the assumption of a collapse of Chinese political control in western China, was a border north of the Karakoram Range along the crests of ranges overlooking China's Tarim Basin that offered maximum defensive capabilities. A second view was an alignment generally following the Indus-Tarim watershed, combined with internal drainage divides, and extending southeast from the Karakoram Pass to the Tibet (Xizang) border. This line (the MaCartney-MacDonald Line) was formally proposed to China (1899), together with other border proposals. China did not respond to the British proposal, and British officials continued to debate the wisdom of various lines. Later maps usually portrayed the northeastern Kashmir border by color tone, or by labeling whatever line was shown as indefinite.

In the middle sector, an 1842 agreement between Gulab Singh, ruler of Kashmir, and Tibetan officials referred to the border as an "old established frontier," although only a single geographic point of reference was contained in the agreement. Both sides, however, assumed that for the most part the main watershed, marked by several well-used passes, fixed the boundary. Ancient controversies, which form the basis for the current dispute, were over grazing rights to several alpine pastures located in the border area.

The eastern sector (the McMahon Line) resulted from the Simla Conference (1913-14), called to define Sino-British spheres of influence in Tibet and attended by representatives of Great Britain, Tibet, and China. On a small-scale map accompanying the agreement, Tibet was divided into an "inner" and an "outer" region, denoting a different type of political status for each. The map also included a border separating British India from Tibet. Great Britain and Tibet, the latter considered politically autonomous at the time, signed the agreement; China, initialing but not signing the agreement, later repudiated it. Compounding the inadequacies of the map, the Simla Agreement contained no detailed description of the boundary alignment.

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
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China was ousted from Tibet in 1912, and its hold on Xinjiang Autonomous Region during the 1930s and 1940s was challenged by growing Soviet influence. When India gained independence (1947) and the Chinese Communists triumphed (1949), the political status of the long China-India border was murky and the lengthy frontier region was essentially unadministered. China's forceful political integration of its remote frontier provinces during the 1950s was matched by similar Indian actions, though done more slowly, to extend New Delhi's control into the Himalayan borderlands. In 1954 new Survey of India maps were published, depicting "definite" India-China boundaries. In northeastern Ladakh, the boundary shown was similar to maximum British claims made at the turn of the century.

During talks and correspondence through the 1950s between India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and China's Premier Zhou Enlai, border issues were deflected by Zhou, and he attributed cartographic differences in the representation of the Sino-India boundary to "old maps" that had not been updated. A 1954 Sino-Indian trade agreement specifying trade routes and passes in the middle sector of the boundary suggested the border alignment only by implication. After China built a road from Xinjiang through northeastern Ladakh to supply its forces in western Xizang, several Indian police were killed (1959) by Chinese troops in Indian-claimed but Chinese-occupied territory. To help defuse tensions, China and India agreed to hold border talks (1960), the outcome of which was a hefty volume consisting of statements and evidence as to each nation's border claims, which served mainly to reinforce the magnitude of the differences between the two sides.

From 1960 onward, diplomatic exchanges became sharper and more acrimonious, as both sides sought to improve their control in the borderlands through road construction and the establishment of border posts. India attempted to counter Chinese "encroachments" in northeastern Ladakh by establishing border posts near or behind Chinese posts, thus increasing tensions. In October 1962, China launched an offensive that quickly threatened the Assam plains. After Beijing called a cease-fire (21 November 1962), Chinese troops were withdrawn to positions held in September. A conference of nonaligned nations meeting in Sri Lanka (December 1962) produced the Colombo Proposals—a series of steps to promote military

disengagement and a political solution. Neither country accepted the proposals in their entirety. From then until the late 1970s, the dispute continued, but at a gradually lowered level of polemical intensity and accompanied by a relaxation of military and political tension. The establishment of a forward Chinese post in disputed territory along the McMahon Line (June 1986) again raised tensions—at least temporarily.

Current Developments and Outlook

Substantive discussions on the alignment of the eastern sector of the border were held for the first time during border talks in November 1985. Chinese negotiators surprised their Indian counterparts by insisting that India make unspecified territorial concessions in the eastern sector of the border. Previous Chinese statements on a border settlement package had suggested a swap of territory that would confirm the McMahon Line alignment in the east in exchange for Indian recognition of Chinese claims (and control) in the western sector of the border. Talks in July 1986, according to Beijing, yielded "no substantial progress" on the border issue. The eighth round of talks in November 1987, likewise, yielded no progress, but relations between the two sides are warming as shown by agreements in 1988 to resume some cross-border trade and for Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to China.

Compromise will be essential by both sides to reach a resolution of the border dispute. In the east, China will apparently demand some territorial concessions by India in exchange for Chinese territorial concessions in the west. A redefinition of the eastern sector of the boundary might, following China's viewpoint, transfer to Xizang (Tibet) a small area near Tawang (Dawang), where Tibetan influence traditionally has been strong. At the very least, China will undoubtedly insist on some deviation from the present alignment, if only to remove the stigma of the McMahon Line and its imposition at a time when China was relatively powerless. In northeastern Ladakh, China's earlier claim (the 1956 line) closely approximates a watershed boundary and is similar to the British proposal made in 1899. This alignment would permit China's road from Xinjiang to Xizang to remain under Chinese control. If agreement can be reached on the eastern and western sections of the border, presumably the two sides could resolve the comparatively minor differences in the middle sector of the border.

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Lengthy bargaining sessions, however, will be required to make even modest progress, and an early resolution of the dispute is unlikely.

Border Treaties and Key Dates 1842

The Maharaja of Kashmir, Gulab Singh, and Tibetan authorities sign a treaty at Leh, reaffirming "old established frontiers" but without defining them.

1899

British Minister in Peking (Sir Claude MacDonald) proposes to China a definition of China-India border from Afghanistan to western Tibet. Proposed boundary (MaCartney-MacDonald Line) aligns north and east of Karakoram Range but leaves most of northeastern Kashmir to China. Chinese officials do not officially respond.

1913

Simla Conference is attended by representatives of Britain, Tibet, and China to define Sino-British spheres of influence in Tibet. Simla Agreement, signed by Great Britain and Tibet but only initialed by China, has map attached that includes a boundary (McMahon Line) between British India and Tibet. China later repudiates the agreement.

1943-47

British begin to bring the Assam Himalaya (later the North East Frontier Agency) under their direct administration.

1950-51

Chinese troops enter western Tibet, crossing northeastern Kashmir area later claimed by India.

1951-52

Chinese military forces enter and gradually extend control.

1954

New Survey of India maps show boundary with China as delimited boundary (previously labeled undefined or by faint color tones), with northern Kashmir borders similar to maximum British claims made in late 19th century.

Sino-India Treaty regulates trade and pilgrim traffic over several passes in middle sector of border; boundary alignment implied, although not specified.

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1957

Chinese complete road from Xinjiang into western Xizang.

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1959

Several Indian police are killed (October) by Chinese in disputed territory; Nehru publicizes border differences; Tibetan uprising brings Tibetan refugees to India and increases border tensions.

1960

Nehru and Zhou Enlai meet and agree to have technical experts meet to set forth claims and evidence. Border officials meet, later issue voluminous report (December).

1962

Sino-Indian border war (October-November) breaks out; Chinese withdraw in December to September positions; Colombo proposals, by nonaligned nations, are presented as basis for settlement.

1979

Indian Foreign Minister visits Beijing and raises border issue.

1981-86

Seven meetings held between Indian and Chinese officials; progress is limited on main border issues. (C)

1987

In February, China protests India's creation of the state of Arunachal Pradesh (vice the North East Frontier Agency) on its side of the McMahon Line. Eighth round of Sino-Indian talks held in November produced no real progress on border, but atmosphere more positive than previous rounds.

1988

Gandhi visit to Beijing scheduled for December—first prime ministerial visit since 1960.

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
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China-USSR

Border Basics

The 7,520-kilometer-long China-USSR boundary, separated by Mongolia and divided into western and eastern sectors, extends from Afghanistan to North Korea. Nearly all of the boundary was delimited by 19th-century treaties and parts were later demarcated. The 4,200-kilometer western sector of the boundary is located in a remote region of high mountains and steppe terrain; in contrast, the 3,320-kilometer eastern sector is primarily a riverine boundary. Except where the border is located in difficult mountainous terrain, various types of border security—such as fences and plowed strips—are common to the Soviet side of the boundary.

The western sector of the boundary begins at the Afghanistan tripoint in a knot of extremely high mountains—the Pamirs—and from there extends generally to the north following drainage divides. At about 40° N the boundary turns eastward for several hundred kilometers and is aligned along the crests of subsidiary ranges of the Tien Shan—a wedge of high mountains extending from the USSR into China. Slightly east of the 80th meridian, in a region of 7,400-meter peaks, the boundary leaves the Tien Shan and turns north. From here to the Mongolian trijunction, the alignment alternates between westeast sections coincident with mountain ranges and northeast-southwest aligned sections that cross plains and steppe country. In a few locations, rivers are followed for short distances. The north-south sections of the boundary cut across broad land corridors, often including west flowing rivers, in which the major west-east transport routes are located.

The western sector of the border is lightly populated, and many areas are empty of people. The indigenous population consists primarily of Turkic groups: south of the Tien Shan, Kirghiz is the major group; north to Mongolia, the Kazakhs predominate. In addition,

there are smaller numbers of other groups, including Russian and Chinese settlers and some military personnel.

The 3,320-kilometer eastern sector is aligned for most of its distance in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers (Heilong Jiang and Wusuli Jiang in Chinese). East of the Mongolia tripoint, the boundary crosses plateau terrain before intersecting the braided channel of the Argun River, a headwater tributary of the Amur. The Amur initially cuts through rugged and almost unpopulated mountainous country before descending and flowing through lowlands to its juncture with the Ussuri. The boundary then follows the Ussuri upstream southward to Lake Khanka. South of the lake, the boundary alignment either coincides with water divides in mainly hilly terrain or consists of straight line sections until it reaches the Tumen River. The land section of the boundary, about 550 kilometers long, was demarcated late in the 19th century; however, only 34 markers were placed.

Although the eastern sector of the border area was initially sparsely populated by several Tungusic groups, the ethnic composition and population density began to change dramatically during the last decades of the 19th century. On the Russian side, large numbers of Russian citizens were settled in areas suited to agriculture, and the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad made possible the economic development of the region and the growth of several urban centers. On China's side of the border, population growth has been slow. Gold panning attracted some settlers during the 19th century, and later border settlements were founded, primarily oriented toward local resources and river trade. A more recent population increase has been related to decreased border tensions since the 1960s and to land reclamation and forestry.

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
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Significant Developments

Attempts by Moscow to improve bilateral relations in 1981 led to the opening of exploratory talks on normalizing relations in October 1982. Between 1982 and 1986 nonpolitical bilateral relations improved, as evidenced by increased economic cooperation, trade, and cultural affairs. It was not until after Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in July 1986, however, that political relations with China began to improve. In the ninth round of normalization talks in October 1986, the first after Gorbachev's speech, the Soviet Union exhibited a new willingness to discuss China's three obstacles to improved relations: Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, and Soviet troops along the border.

In this atmosphere of improving relations, both sides agreed in February 1987 to resume border talks, suspended since June 1978. Since then, border trade has increased significantly: more border towns and river ports have been opened for trade, local regions on both sides are allowed to engage in direct trade, and interior provinces may trade goods through border provinces. Also, by the 12th round of normalization talks held in June 1988, Moscow had established a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan, taken steps to promote negotiations on Cambodia, and withdrawn some troops from Mongolia, and Beijing had begun to soften its position on the political obstacles to normalization. These developments led in October 1988 to the first sign of real improvement on the border issue when at the third round of border talks the two sides reached agreement on the alignment of part of the eastern boundary. Sovereignty of the two strategic islands opposite Khabarovsk—Tarabarov and Bol'shoy Ussuriysk (Heixiazi in Chinese) apparently remains in dispute.

Frontier History

Contacts between the Russian and Chinese empires were first recorded in the 17th century when Russian military expeditions explored Siberia, reaching the mouth of the Amur River in 1644. A military post was established on the upper Amur in 1665, and Russian settlers were brought in. The Manchus, whose homeland was northeastern China and who at the time ruled China, became alarmed and dispersed the Russian settlers and military presence (1683-85). Negotiations led to the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) by which China acquired virtually the entire Amur River basin.

Sino-Russian contacts were minimal over the following 150 years. Russian explorers, however, continued to survey their vast Pacific maritime territory and gained an appreciation for the importance of the Amur valley to future Russian development. After Chinese frontier markers were discovered to be far south of the vaguely defined border, Russia became emboldened (1840-58) to reestablish posts on the upper Amur. The Chinese presence in the region was limited to a few military posts, and troops manning these garrisons had been largely withdrawn to counter internal rebellion in China and the increasing pressures of the Western powers. When China was forced to enter into negotiations with Russia (1858-60) it was from a position of weakness. The Treaty of Aigun (1858) gave the northern bank of the Amur to Russia and provided for joint administration of the territory between the Ussuri and the Pacific. The Treaty of Peking (1860) then transferred the Ussuri territory to Russia; a provision of the treaty also called for delimiting the Sino-Russian border in Central Asia. South of the Ussuri headwaters, the boundary was drawn roughly north-south and demarcated, initially in 1861, and redemarcated in 1886 (Treaty of Hun-ch'un). Only 34 markers were placed over a distance of 550 kilometers; an inspection in the 1920s found that many markers had disappeared.

In the west, Mongol and Turkic groups inhabited the vast sweep of territory from the headwaters of the Argun to Afghanistan. A trickle of trade between China and Russia through Mongolia during the 18th century led to border treaties, and parts of the current Mongolia-Russia boundary are based on those agreements. Chinese influence had existed in this region periodically, although for long periods in China's history the Central Asian grasslands and oases were free from outside control. In what is now Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Chinese interest was rekindled during the ascendancy of the Manchu Empire of China in the 18th century: tribal groups and oasesbased principalities were subdued; military posts established; and settlers, primarily Manchurian tribal peoples, given land, principally in the Ili river valley. Political dissenters and criminals were also exiled to the area. In the 19th century, Russian advances south and southeast across the steppes led to contact with Chinese military pickets.

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By a provision of the Treaty of Peking (1860), the Sino-Russian border in Central Asia was defined. The Chuguchak Protocol (1864) delimited the boundary. During negotiations, the Russian view prevailed that the border should be drawn along the line of permanent Chinese pickets rather than the location of temporary pickets posted farther west, which was the Chinese view. The St. Petersburg Treaty (1881), following more than a decade of rebellion and warfare between Muslim groups and the Chinese, modified earlier agreement in two areas. A series of protocols (1885-93) delimited the border and provided for later demarcation of individual sections of the lengthy boundary. Russia was forced to withdraw from the eastern Ili valley, and China gave up territory elsewhere in the Ili valley and in the area of the Chernyy Irtysh (Black Irtysh), a river flowing west into Ozero (Lake) Zaysan.

The southernmost section of the boundary from about 38°40′ N. to Afghanistan was not delimited. One of the protocols of the 1881 treaty stated that the Russian boundary extended southwestward from 38°40′ N.; an 1894 exchange of notes that the status quo was to be maintained is cited by each side to justify its version of the boundary. The de facto boundary is the Russian version of the line.

Except for the Tsitsihar Treaty (1911), which China rejected and that realigned the boundary from the Argun River west, there were no major disagreements over the Sino-Russian boundary until the 1960s. After the Russian Revolution, Moscow declared its intent to renounce all treaties, including those with China, negotiated by the tsars. A border conference with Chinese officials was held (1926), but no agreement was reached. After Japan's occupation of northeastern China (Manchuria) in the early 1930s, there was a buildup of Japanese and Russian military forces along the border that raised the issue of control of the Amur-Ussuri islands. In Xinjiang, Russian influence increased and for a short period in the late 1940s a pro-Soviet "East Turkistan People's Republic" was established in Xinjiang adjacent to the border, though no changes in the border were made.

After years of "fraternal friendship," border tensions increased as the Sino-Soviet rift (1960) deepened. Publicized differences (1963) over the border led to

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the initiation of talks (1964) that soon broke off over the completely different approaches taken by the two sides. China insisted that a new boundary treaty be negotiated and that the USSR renounce the old treaties, which China claimed had cost them 1.5 million square kilometers of territory. Moscow's position was that only minor clarifications and, presumably, redemarcation in some areas were required, using the old treaties as the basis for readjustments. Following the breakup of the talks, the polemical war intensified and was accompanied by a military buildup in the border area, primarily by the USSR. In March 1969 there were bloody clashes over river islands. A meeting in September 1969 between Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai defused the charged atmosphere and provided for the reopening of border negotiations (October 1969). Border talks were periodically held for more than a decade with few visible signs of progress.

Current Developments and Outlook

The recent warming of Sino-Soviet relations has aided movement on territorial problems. The two countries have agreed to conduct a survey of the western sector similar to the one on which the October 1988 agreement on part of the eastern sector was based. As long as relations continue to improve, we expect the boundary talks to continue on a regular basis, with some progress toward resolving territorial problems.

Nonetheless, the length of the Sino-Soviet border, the lack of demarcation, or wide spacing of markers, and the poor quality of most treaty maps delimiting the boundary could continue to complicate efforts to resolve the longstanding boundary disputes. Details of the agreement on the eastern sector have not yet been released, and it is likely that the most contentious issues remain unresolved. Before a final, mutually agreeable settlement covering the entire Sino-Soviet border can be reached, significant problems still have to be resolved:

• Riverine Boundaries

— Amur-Ussuri Islands. Neither the Treaty of Aigun nor the Treaty of Peking allocated the several hundred islands. The islands form the 25**X**1

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least contentious part of the eastern boundary. It is likely that agreement has been reached on a substantial proportion of the islands using the thalweg principle (deepest navigable channel).

- Tarabarov and Bol'shoy Ussuriysk Islands (Heixiazi: Chinese). These low, marshy islands at the Amur-Ussuri confluence have considerable strategic significance for the USSR by their location adjacent to Khabarovsk. The Soviets occupied the area and claim that the main river channels meet at the end of the westernmost island. The physical characteristics of the rivers support China's view (the channels meet at the eastern end of the island). The USSR almost certainly will find it difficult to give up possession of the islands, however, and talks most likely will be contentious and could be protracted.
- Upper Argun Islands and Floodplain. This wide, braided channel poses problems in that USSR maps show the boundary along the southern channel. Chinese maps show boundary along the northern channel. The 1911 Tsitsihar Treaty allocated the islands, but China does not accept the treaty.

• Boundary Treaty Problems

- Pamirs. The Chinese were not a party to the 1895 British-Russian agreement that created the Vakhan (Wakhan Corridor) and confirmed de facto Russian possession of the Pamir territo-
- ry to the north. About 30,000 to 35,000 square kilometers are in dispute. China's claims are based on 18th century Manchu military expeditions in the area and the boundary protocol to the St. Petersburg Treaty (1881), which states that the Russian boundary was to run southwest from latitude 38°40′ N., the Uzbel Shankou (Uzbel Pass).
- Manzhouli-Zabaykal'sk Area. This is a small but strategic area (the point where the Trans-Siberian Railroad enters China) where the boundary was moved south a few kilometers by terms of the Tsitsihar Treaty (1911). The de facto boundary follows the alignment of the

1911 treaty. China refuses to recognize the validity of the agreement because it was signed only a few days before the Manchu Empire was overthrown and a new government formed. About 900 square kilometers of territory are involved.

• Demarcation Problems

- Western Sector. Only parts of the boundary were demarcated by protocols to the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881). Because the boundary maps are old and unreliable and few markers were placed, some minor border adjustments are probable. Both sides have agreed to take into account the present situation of the inhabitants—an indication that any territorial exchanges are likely to be small.
- Lake Khanka-Tumen River Sector. A demarcated boundary, but the markers are so widely spaced that different interpretations of the alignment between markers are probable.

In the eastern sector, the Soviets may eventually be willing to acknowledge Chinese ownership of Tarabarov and Bol'shoy Ussuriysk islands in exchange for significant Chinese territorial concessions in another part of the border. To avoid the appearance of conceding territory—a concern that could affect the Soviet position on other disputed territories—the Soviets could also claim that aerial photography has shown that the natural flow of the rivers changed course. In talks concerning the western sector, China is likely to continue to use the Pamirs dispute as a bargaining device to extract Russian territorial concessions elsewhere. As in past boundary negotiations with other nations where China maintained sizable territorial claims, for example, the Burma-China border, Beijing may be willing to settle for minor alignment changes and minute territorial exchanges. Nonetheless, even with the recent border resurveys and any subsequent redemarcation, there will be an enormous amount of work to mark the 7,500kilometer-long border and ample opportunities for differing interpretations. Furthermore, any boundary settlement will need to take into account the shifting courses of the eastern border rivers over the long term.

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Border Treaties and Key Dates

1640-85

Russians initially explore Amur basin and establish posts on upper Amur.

1689

Treaty of Nerchinsk (August) signed; China gains control of Amur basin, and boundary is defined but not marked on the ground.

1727

Treaty of Kiakhta (August) signed and subsequent series of protocols delimits border from Mongolia east to Argun headwaters.

1850

In violation of Treaty of Nerchinsk, Russian posts, settlements, and officials reestablished in Amur valley.

1858

Treaty of Aigun (May) provides that north banks of Argun and Amur, except for area of Manchu settlement near Zeya river, are transferred to Russian sovereignty. Area between Ussuri and Pacific is under joint Sino-Russian administration.

1860

Treaty of Peking (November) transferred jointly administered Ussuri territory to Russia; boundary follows Ussuri to headwaters to Lake Khanka, then south to Tumen River. One provision calls for delimitation of Sino-Russian border in Central Asia, following line of Chinese pickets.

1864

Protocol of Chuguchak (September) delimits Central Asian border, using major water divides for most of the way.

1887

Treaty of St. Petersburg (February) redefines parts of Central Asia border; provisions for Russian withdrawal from eastern part of Ili valley, and Chinese loss of territory in Ili area and elsewhere. Series of protocols (1882-93) delimits and partially demarcates various boundary sections.

1886

Treaty of Hun-ch'un redemarcates boundary south from Lake Khanka to Tumen; new and additional markers (total of 34) placed.

1895

Anglo-Russian agreement (March) establishes Wakhan Corridor and China-Afghanistan-Russia tripoint and confirms by implication Russian control north in the Pamirs in border area left undelimited by Treaty of Peking protocols.

1900

Boxer Rebellion includes forcible removal (including many deaths) by Russia of Manchu settlers from so-called 64-village area on left bank of Amur.

1911

Treaty of Tsitsihar (December) delimits boundary east from Mongolia and including Argun River; boundary alignment moved 8 to 10 kilometers south of previous location. China rejects validity of the treaty, signed at time of the fall of the Manchu administration and the formation of new government.

1926

Russian and Chinese officials reportedly meet over renegotiations of boundary treaties; no agreement is reached.

1951

Agreement (January) is reached on river navigation on border rivers, including Amur and Ussuri.

1963

Border problems, old treaties, and related border matters in polemical vein are aired.

1964

Border talks are held and broken off in August; USSR position is that boundaries need minor "clarifications" and revision, whereas China wants Moscow to admit that old treaties were "unequal" and a new boundary treaty negotiated.

1969

Border troops skirmish over islands in Ussuri (March), polemics increase, and military tension rises. September meeting between Soviet and Chinese leaders (Kosygin and Zhou Enlai) lowers tensions and restarts border talks (October).

1969-78

Soviets and Chinese meet periodically to discuss border issues. China explains it will use present boundary as basis for settlement (although new treaty and survey/demarcation are required) and will consider situation of inhabitants in disputed areas. Talks break off.

1982-85

"Normalization" of relations is periodically discussed; considerable progress is made on trade, cultural matters, and relaxation of border tensions, but not on border.

1986

Parties agree to reopen border talks in 1987.

1987

Border talks resumed—first round held in February. In March a protocol is signed agreeing to make boundary rivers more navigable, and in April a border trade agreement is signed. Second round of border talks—held in August—establishes technical working groups to work out details of eastern river boundary.

1988

Joint aerial and ground surveys of eastern sector completed. Third round of border talks held in October resulted in agreement on most of eastern sector of border. The sovereignty of the strategic islands opposite Khabarovsk apparently remains in dispute. Aerial survey of western sector begun.

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
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China-Vietnam

Border Basics

The 1,281-kilometer-long China-Vietnam boundary extends west to east from the Laos trijunction to the Gulf of Tonkin. The boundary was delimited by treaties (1887 and 1895) between China and France. The 1895 boundary agreement amended the earlier treaty in several areas and extended the boundary west from the Black River to the present trijunction with Laos. Slightly more than 300 individual markers were placed by demarcation teams during the 1890-97 period. Recent maps suggest that about 280 markers remain in place. Boundary markers were irregularly spaced, depending on the terrain and population density, with the majority located in the eastern half of the boundary.

Boundary commissioners used mainly drainage divides (about 820 kilometers) or the median lines of streams (350 kilometers) to mark the boundary. The western boundary sector (Laos to the Red River) crosses rugged, mountainous terrain; most of the boundary is aligned along ridgelines (elevations about 2,000 meters) or streams. In the central sector (Red River to approximately 106° E) the boundary is

aligned through mountainous but somewhat lower terrain and, in places, rugged limestone terrain (karst topography) is interspersed with bits of lowland. The eastern sector of the boundary is initially aligned in a north-south direction for some distance before turning to the east to pass through a landscape of low hills and scattered lowlands. This sector of the border is comparatively well populated and contains a number of cross-border routes. In some places the border is marked by cleared or plowed strips.

The western half of the boundary passes through lightly populated country, and the majority of the people are concentrated in the few settlements located at border crossing points and in scattered areas of lowland. In the hillier areas, tribal groups predominate. In the lowlands and valleys in the eastern half of the border, the population on the China side of the border consists of Zhuang—a Tai-related group—and Han Chinese. On the Vietnam side of the border, the population is mainly ethnic Vietnamese but with a significant concentration of tribal groups in some areas.

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Significant Developments

Since the 1980 breakoff of talks designed to improve relationships, China and Vietnam have continued to stand firm on the border question. China usually orchestrates military pressures in concert with Vietnam's level of military activity in Cambodia. Although China occasionally threatens to teach Vietnam "a second lesson," the scale and intensity of military action have been much reduced, as compared with the 1979 situation, as China continues to put higher priority on its domestic-development programs.

Frontier History

The China-Vietnam boundary was established as the consequence of growing French economic and political interests in Indochina during the 19th century.

The French, seeking a route to tap the China market, signed an agreement (1874) with the Vietnamese monarch to open the Red River to French trade. Despite the agreement, civil unrest prevented development of the route and led to renewed French intervention and the establishment of protectorates over central Vietnam (Annam) and northern Vietnam (Tonkin) in 1884. China protested, but, after months of inconclusive conflict, a treaty was signed (June 1885) that included a provision for survey and demarcation of a boundary. The boundary treaty (June 1887) delimited the boundary from the Gulf of Tonkin west to the Black River. A second border convention (1895)

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amended the earlier treaty with several alignment adjustments and carried the boundary west to its present junction with Laos. The boundary was demarcated by several different boundary teams; about 310 concrete markers were placed.

After France withdrew from Vietnam (1954), China and Vietnam agreed in an exchange of letters (1957-58) to reaffirm the status quo and respect the existing boundary. Future disputes and adjustments, it was stated, were to be settled through negotiations at the national level. During the 1970s, other events influenced Sino-Vietnamese relations. These included China's seizure (1974) of the Paracel Islands, then occupied by South Vietnam; an increasing tilt by Hanoi towards Moscow for aid; and China's patronage of Cambodia, Vietnam's ancient enemy and—after 1975—quarrelsome and unpredictable neighbor.

During the 1970s border disagreements and incidents increased, prompting a Chinese proposal (1975) to discuss the boundary. Vietnam initially rebuffed the proposal, but, after additional political jockeying, talks commenced (1977) in Beijing. Both sides tabled comprehensive proposals that contained similar provisions on resolving local disputes, used the old boundary conventions as the basis for the boundary alignment, and resurveyed and redemarcated the boundary. Additional points were raised and modifications made, but the negotiations broke off in the summer of 1978 without significant progress toward reaching a settlement.

A second dispute on the agenda of the 1977 border talks concerned division of the Gulf of Tonkin's waters. This dispute is tied to the land boundary, in that Article 2 of the 1887 boundary convention used a meridian (108°03'18") to allocate numerous offshore islands (between France and China) whose ownership was not made clear in the earlier 1885 treaty. When Vietnam decided to grant offshore petroleum leases in 1973, the meridian cited in the 1887 convention was used to divide—to Hanoi's considerable benefit—all of the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. China protested, but a discussion of the maritime dispute was not held until the 1977 talks. Because the two sides were far

apart, the negotiators agreed to hold the maritime issue in abeyance until the land boundary dispute had been settled.

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After Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in late 1978, Chinese forces crossed Vietnam's border in February 1979. After capturing the key border town of Lang Son, about 20 kilometers inside Vietnam, China called for negotiations to end the fighting and withdrew its forces. Talks began in Hanoi in April 1979, later moving to Beijing. Hanoi's position has been to negotiate the border differences, using the earlier talks and proposals as a basis. Beijing, however, has tied resolving the border issue to a broad improvement in relations involving other political issues. The talks broke off in early 1980, after failure to find common ground for a workable solution.

Current Developments and Outlook

There have been no significant diplomatic developments to normalize relations since the breaking off of talks in early 1980. Vietnam has periodically pressed for a resumption of discussions, but preconditions announced by China in July 1981 have dampened chances. These preconditions would have Hanoi abandon Vietnamese "hegemonism" over Laos and Cambodia and cease allowing the Soviet Union to use Vietnam as a "forward base." Periodic border shellings by China and Beijing's threats to teach Vietnam a "second lesson" have coincided with Vietnamese military sweeps in Cambodia and actions near the Thai border. The largest border actions since 1979 took place in 1984 when China occupied for several months high points 1 to 2 kilometers inside Vietnam.

There is no record of any concern over the location of the boundary from the time of demarcation in the 1890s until the expulsion of the French from Vietnam in 1954. The backwater character of much of the border area, including the fact that long stretches of the frontier are inhabited by ethnic minority groups, apparently precluded much interest in the border. The drawing of the boundary, and particularly the readjustments made in the 1895 treaty, suggest that the

final alignment was a fair representation of the	1885	
division between Chinese and Vietnamese authority in	Treaty of Peace (June) between China and France	
the late 19th century. This is supported by Chinese	provides for boundary delimitation.	
and Vietnamese statements in the 1970s on settling		
the border issue.	1887	25X1
	Convention between China and France (June) delimits	
The charges of border incursions made by both sides	frontier.	
reveal that no major territorial issues are at stake.		
Most reports suggest differences typical of lengthy	1895	
boundaries that include many stretches with few	Boundary convention between China and France	
markers. Both sides accuse the other of moving border	(June) supplements 1887 agreement and realigns	
markers for their own advantages. In some areas	boundary in several areas.	
Vietnam apparently permitted China easements for		
purposes of roads, water points, pastures, and fire-	1890-97	
wood sites. These "borrowed lands," Vietnam now	Six joint teams demarcate boundary.	
complains, are claimed by China. In some lightly	1014	
populated areas with few boundary markers, uncer-	1954	
tainty may be legitimate as to the boundary align-	Geneva agreements are signed, Vietnam is parti-	051/4
ment.	tioned, and France withdraws.	25 X 1
Progress toward a resolution of the border dispute	1957-58	
depends primarily on improvement in overall national	Party Central Committees of China and France agree	
relations and in particular on each nation's relation-	to reaffirm boundary status quo and to settle bound-	
ship with the Soviet Union. There is little indication	ary problems at national level.	
that these political equations will soon change, partic-	ary problems at national level.	
ularly the relationship between Moscow and Hanoi,	1973	
nor will Vietnam likely relinquish its dominant politi-	Vietnam proposes talks to China over division of Gulf	
cal role in Cambodia and Laos.	of Tonkin waters, based on 1887 boundary convention	25X1
	provision.	20/()
A resumption of border talks will probably be based		
on previously stated positions of each side. Vietnam	1975	
argues for maintenance of the borderline as it was	China proposes to Vietnam to hold border talks;	
officially drawn in treaty maps and other documents	Hanoi demurs because of problems of reunification.	
of the 1895 boundary convention. China's position		
places more stress on maintenance of the status quo as	1977-78	
it exists on the ground, a principle agreed to in the	Sino-Vietnamese talks are held on land boundary (sea	
1957-58 exchanges between Hanoi and Beijing. China	boundary postponed until resolution of land bound-	
also holds that in some cases adjustments be made on	ary). Many Chinese flee northern Vietnam.	
a "fair and reasonable basis," taking into account the	1070	
interests of local inhabitants. This suggests that in a	1979	
final settlement Beijing would probably seek a few minor adjustments, although China also agrees that	China invades Vietnam (February) in response to	
the settlement should be based on the Sino-French	Vietnamese invasion (December 1978) of Cambodia,	
boundary conventions.	China's client, and Hanoi's growing ties to Moscow.	25 X 1
oundary controlls.		23/1
Border Treaties and Key Dates	•	
1884	·	
French protectorates are established over central and		
northern Vietnam.		

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Series of talks are held in attempt to normalize relations and resolve border difficulties. China breaks off talks.


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India-Pa	kistan ((Kashmir	Area)	
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India-Pakistan (Kashmir Area)

Border Basics

The Cease-Fire Line dividing Indian-held Kashmir from the Pakistani-held part is 875 kilometers long and extends from the Punjab Plains in the south to the glaciers of the Karakoram Range in the north. The line crosses hilly, mountainous terrain, much of it quite rugged. The alignment reflects the military situation at the time of the 1948 cease-fire (and minor modifications made later), and prominent terrain features were used in its drawing to more easily identify the location of the line. Generally, the line winds across lightly (and mostly Muslim) populated country.

The southern half of the Cease-Fire Line is drawn roughly north-south, although there are also many short, east-west aligned sections. After the line crosses the Jhelum River, it turns to the east and northeast, paralleling the Kishanganga River for some distance, before turning northeast and ascending the high ridges and extremely rugged terrain of the Karakoram Range. Minor adjustments were made following the fighting during the 1971-72 war. This slightly revised alignment is termed the line of control. The northern terminus of the 1949 Cease-Fire Line, including its redefinition in 1972, was not precisely fixed, presumably because the terrain consisted of snowfields and glaciers at elevations in excess of 5,000 meters. Beyond (north of) the terminal point of the line, there is a gap of about 80 kilometers to the northeast before the China boundary is reached at the Karakoram Pass.

Significant Developments

A dispute has been growing since 1983 over the extension of the Cease-Fire Line (Line of Control) north from its present terminal in the glaciers of the Karakoram Range. Fighting broke out in 1984 on the glaciers north of the terminus of the Line, and periodic skirmishes continue as each side presses for terrain advantages. Talks were begun in early 1986

between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan to seek a solution to the issue.

Frontier History

The state of Jammu and Kashmir, commonly termed Kashmir, came under the rule of a Hindu military adventurer, Gulab Singh, early in the 19th century. Great Britain recognized Gulab Singh as the Maharaja in 1846, and Hindu rule continued until British India was partitioned in 1947. Although it was assumed that Kashmir, as a contiguous and predominantly Muslim state, would accede to Pakistan, the Hindu Maharaja hesitated and asked for standstill agreements from both states. In October 1947 a Muslim armed revolt began, aided by tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier District (now called North-West Frontier Province), who had arms supplied by the Pakistan Army. The Muslim forces began to threaten Srinagar, the capital, on 27 October, and the Maharaja had to accede officially to India in order to receive Indian military assistance. The act was strongly denounced by Pakistan.

Indian troops, quickly flown into Kashmir, halted the Muslim advance, though fighting continued throughout 1948. (Regular Pakistani troops entered the fray in May 1948). A cease-fire was arranged through the auspices of the United Nations on 31 December 1948, and six months later an agreement was reached on the location of a cease-fire line. At the time of Kashmir's accession, both Lord Mountbatten, then Governor-General of India, and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharal Nehru stated that a referendum, conducted under international auspices, should be held to determine Kashmir's political status once fighting ceased and law and order were restored.

In 1949 a UN commission attempted to secure agreement from India and Pakistan to implement provisions contained in a UN resolution calling for a plebiscite. Despite lengthy efforts by the United Nations and a series of mediators, little progress was made as differing interpretations of the conditions and wording of the resolution, plus side issues, came to dominate the discussions. Additional irritants, such as

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Pakistan's request for American military aid (1954) and Kashmir's formal accession to India (1956), also complicated the talks. In the early 1960s, following India's rejection of a proposed plebiscite, bilateral talks over a permanent partition were stymied because neither side would compromise on possession of the fertile and populous Vale of Kashmir.

Since 1965 two brief Indo-Pakistani wars have been fought (1965 and 1971-72), both involving military actions along the Cease-Fire Line. The 1965 war began with infiltrators attempting to foment revolt in Indian-controlled Kashmir; in 1971 a civil war erupted in what was then East Pakistan, leading to the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. Peace talks following each conflict reached agreement on the need for peacefully resolving the differences over Kashmir. In the Simla talks of July 1972, the two sides agreed that the "line of control" existing at the time of the December 1971 cease-fire was to be respected. Although a line was delineated in December 1972, its alignment differed little from the earlier Cease-Fire Line. After the 1972 Simla Agreement, the Kashmir issue subsided. Aside from periodic charges of "line" violations and the 1983-84 skirmishes over control of the Siachen Glacier, major developments in Kashmir have focused on internal measures designed to strengthen administrative control and improve economic conditions.

Current Developments and Outlook

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Fighting between India and Pakistan over the Siachen Glacier area (1984-85) resulted from the ambiguous definition of the terminus of the Line of Control and the consequent "gap" between this point and the China border. According to the joint statement of 12 December 1972, the Line of Control extends "... to Thang (inclusive to India), thence eastwards joining the glaciers." Although both India and Pakistan agree that the Karakoram Pass—about 80 kilometers to the northeast—is on the China border, they disagree as to the alignment of the China border west of the Karakoram Pass because of their differing versions of Kashmir's northern border. Pakistan's version is based on a Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement (1963); India's version is unilaterally drawn because it has not yet been discussed with China, pending a solution to the Kashmir problem. The China-Pakistan boundary treaty contains a clause that calls for a redefinition of the boundary if India and Pakistan resolve their dispute over Kashmir.

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In the 1970s and 1980s Pakistan sponsored mountainclimbing expeditions into the area near and to the north of the Line of Control. Pakistani patrols began operating in the vicinity of the Siachen Glacier, which extends from northwest to southeast for about 50 kilometers, and maps in mountaineering journals began showing the area as a part of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. In response, India moved military units into the area and small-scale clashes broke out in both 1984 and 1985. Some casualties resulted. Working in an environment of snowfields, ice, extremely high elevations, and severe climate has produced physical and morale problems for the military units of both sides.

A summit meeting between Prime Minister Gandhi and President Zia produced an agreement to seek ways to normalize relations between the two states through establishing a framework for resolving the current major irritant—control of the glaciers. A meeting between the Foreign Ministers in January 1986, however, did little to advance a solution. India's position is that an overall improvement in relations must be achieved before the Siachen Glacier problem can be settled; Pakistan, however, maintains that the glacier issue must be resolved before there is an overall normalization of relations.

A settlement of the Siachen Glacier issue requires an extension of the Line of Control northward to an agreed-on location on the boundary with China. India holds that the line should run in a northwesterly direction, giving it control of the Siachen Glacier. Pakistan presumably would continue the line to the northeast to place the Siachen Glacier under its control. India is fearful that Pakistani control of the glacier would give access to the Nubra valley and thence to Leh and other important Indian facilities in eastern Kashmir. Because India now controls the key western approaches to the glacier, there is little

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impetus for New Delhi to proceed with the negotiations on terms other than the present favorable military situation. An agreement over this area might provide some impetus to resolve the overall problem of Kashmir. Border Treaties and Key Dates	 1962-63 Ministerial talks fail on proposals for partition after India's rejection of plebiscite. 1965 Armed infiltrators from Pakistani-controlled Kashmir attempt (August) to stir up revolt in India Kashmir;
1846 Treaty of Amritsar ends the war between the Sikhs	hostilities ensue, followed by September cease-fire.
and the British, confirms Gulab Singh's rule over Jammu and Kashmir, and permits Hindu rule over predominantly Muslim-inhabited area.	1966 Tashkent Declaration calls for talks, but subsequent diplomatic meetings are unproductive.
Indian Independence Act allows princely states to choose independence or accession to either India or Pakistan; Maharaja of Kashmir hesitates, asks for	1971 India-Pakistan war (3-17 December) over East Pakistan leads to military clashes in Kashmir.
more time (August). Muslim uprising (early October), aided by Pakistan, threatens Vale of Kashmir; Maharaja has to sign the Instrument of Accession (27 October) before aid can be obtained. The instrument itself has nothing in it pertaining to aid.	1972 Simla talks (July) provide that "line of control" at time of 1971 cease-fire will form division between Indian-Pakistani-controlled areas of Kashmir ("line of control" differs only marginally from 1949 cease-fire line).
1948 Cease-fire goes into effect (31 December), leaving India in control of nearly two-thirds of the area and three-fourths of the population.	1984-87 Clashes over Siachen Glacier area, north of "terminus of line of control."
1949 Cease-fire line established; UN observation team supervises observance.	1986 Talks at foreign minister level fail to make progress over Siachen issue.
1949-54 Discussions held under auspices of UN fail to reach agreement on implementation of UN's 5 January 1949 plan for a plebiscite.	1988 Talks on the Siachen Glacier issue in September cordial but made no progress.
1956 Kashmir's Constituent Assembly declares (17 November) that Kashmir is "integral part of Union of India" and comprises all territories extant as of 15 August 1947.	
1957-58	

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UN Security Council reviews Kashmir problem; reaf-

firms plebiscite plan under UN supervision.

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
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Japan-USSR	(Northern	Territories)
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Japan-USSR (Northern Territories)

Border Basics

The dispute over "the Northern Territories," a term coined in Japan to designate the southern Kuril Islands, has strained Japan-USSR relations since 1945. The disputed islands include Kunashiri-to, Etorofu-to (Russian names Ostrov Kunashir and Ostrov Iturup), Shikotan-to, and the Habomai Islands. The islands are small, and their total area amounts to 4,996 square kilometers-to (Etorofu-to, 3,139; Kunashiri, 1,500; Shikotan, 255; and the five islets comprising the Habomais, 102). The islands are mostly mountainous and partly forested. Numerous small ports and anchorages are located on the larger islands. The surrounding waters have a rich marine life, and the traditional economy has been based on fishing and a little forestry. The Japanese population of the islands was resettled to Japan after World War II. At present, the population of the southern Kurils is estimated at about 16,000—approximately the number before World War II-of which all but a thousand are located on the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu.

The location of the Kurils is the islands' most strategic asset. Stretching for more than 1,000 kilometers from southwest to northeast, the 36 islands and numerous rocky islets provide a protective shield and barrier for Soviet naval forces and bases located in the Soviet Far East. Straits and passageways between the islands provide deepwater access to the Pacific, except during the December-April period when pack ice restricts use.

Significant Developments

Japanese hopes for Soviet concessions on territorial issues were raised in January 1986 when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Tokyo and signaled an apparent shift from Moscow's policy of refusing to discuss the Northern Territories to one of some flexibility on the issue. Since the 1986 meeting, however, six roundtable conferences on issues relating to improved bilaterial relations, three meetings between foreign ministers, and a July 1988 meeting in Moscow between Prime Minister Nakasone and Secretary Gorbachev resulted in no progress on the

disputed islands. The Soviet and Japanese foreign ministers are scheduled to meet again in December in Tokyo.

Frontier History

The Kuril Islands were explored systematically first in the early 18th century, when Russians from Kamchatka began moving south, island by island, extracting tribute (animal pelts) from the Ainu, the principal inhabitants of the islands. Japan had ties to the Kuril Ainu through trade, but information concerning Russian penetration of the Kurils did not reach Japanese authorities until the mid-18th century. Japanese expeditions into the southern Kurils did not occur until very late in the century, although Japan did establish a trading post on Kunashiri in 1754. Japanese and Russian interest in the islands waxed and waned, but apparently neither Japan nor Russia had a clear idea of its territorial limits in the region until the mid-19th century. Political events and issues elsewhere primarily pressure by Western nations to open Japan to trade and growing activity by American and British sealers and whalers in Kuril waters—forced Japanese-Russian political contacts. The Treaty of Shimoda (1855) allocated the southernmost islands (Kunashiri and Etorofu) to Japan, and the central and northern islands to Russia; Sakhalin was made a joint posses-

The joint occupation of Sakhalin proved unsatisfactory, and both countries sought exclusive jurisdiction. Neither nation was inclined to relinquish the island, although both expressed a willingness to part with some of the Kurils. A new government in Japan, however, agreed (1874) to offer Sakhalin to Russia in exchange for ownership of the entire Kuril chain, part of which Russia had offered during earlier talks. The terms were accepted by Russia in the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1875); in addition, Japan was granted fishing and commercial privileges around the Sea of Okhotsk littoral. Japan recovered the southern half of Sakhalin as the victor in the Russo-Japanese War, by terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), and also gained fishing rights in the waters surrounding Kamchatka. This spurred a dramatic growth in Japan's northern Pacific fishery operations based in the northern Kurils.

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Shortly after the United States was drawn into World War II, President Roosevelt made overtures toward the Soviets for their participation in the Pacific conflict. Moscow later pledged to enter, but during discussions made Soviet participation contingent on the "return" of Sakhalin and the Kurils. Despite a 1944 Department of State position paper recommending that the southern Kurils remain a part of Japan, at the Yalta Conference (early 1945) President Roosevelt accepted Premier Stalin's demand that southern Sakhalin and the Kurils "be returned." Soviet forces occupied the Kurils in late August 1945, repatriated the Japanese after their functions could be filled by Soviet immigrants, and amended the Soviet Constitution (1947) to include the islands as an integral component of the nation.

Japan renounced all claims to its former possessions, including the Kurils, when it signed the Japanese Peace Treaty in 1951. Because the USSR did not sign the treaty, a state of war still technically existed, and negotiations were undertaken (1955) to draft a peace treaty. The disposition of the Kurils proved a major stumblingblock. Instead of a treaty, a "peace declaration" was signed (October 1956), ending the state of war and normalizing relations. The declaration also included a provision that Russia would hand over Shikotan and the Habomais at the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Little progress has been made on negotiating a peace treaty, primarily because of the "Northern Territories" issue. Successive Japanese prime ministers have pledged to recover the territories, and Soviet officials in response state that the issue has been "solved." Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Moscow (October 1973), at which time he pushed hard for the Japanese position on the islands, produced an official joint communique stating that resolving problems left over from World War II "would contribute to good relations in the context of peace treaty negotiations." Later meetings between Soviet and Japanese officials, however, made no headway and, in Japan's view, resulted in regression in that Soviet officials backed away from repeating the "unresolved problems" language of the 1973 communique.

In January 1986, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Tokyo and paved the way for renewed peace treaty discussions (in abeyance since 1978) with Japanese Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro. A joint communique concluding the visit noted "problems" in concluding a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty, citing the wording of the communique issued following the 1973 heads-of-government meeting. Although Japanese officials saw in this a glimmer of hope for adjustments on the Northern Territories, Shevardnadze indicated at the concluding press conference that the Soviet position on territorial issues is "well known" and "unchanged."

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Current Developments and Outlook

Despite the continuing dialogue, repeated hints by the Soviets of greater flexibility, and an apparent desire on both sides to improve relations, we believe there is little room for optimism that the deadlock on the Northern Territories issues will be broken soon. The Soviets believe that they have a strong case resting on 18th-century Russian "prior discovery and settlement" of the Kurils—agreements made during World War II in which the Kurils were promised to the USSR—and Japan's renunciation of its claims to the Kurils through signing the 1951 Japanese Peace Treaty. Japan counters by citing 19th-century treaties between Japan and Russia in which Japan initially (1855) gained ownership of the southern Kurils, where its influence had always been strongest, and later (1875) control over the entire chain. Japan also has attempted to differentiate, on various grounds, the southern Kurils from the rest of the islands. Although Russian claims of discovery and exploration of most of the islands cannot be refuted, Japan can point out that administration and economic development of the islands on a significant scale did not occur until Japanese rule. However, Japan's claims that it was not a party to the World War II agreements and that the Japanese Peace Treaty did not assign sovereignty to the renounced territories are arguments the Soviets reject. The US position is that the southern Kurils "occupied by the Soviet Union since 1945, are claimed by Japan."

The Soviet position has hardened over time, and in the past 15 years there has been a significant military buildup in the southern islands. Although earlier (pre-World War II) Russian statements and references had generally accepted Japanese primacy in the southern islands, longer range Soviet goals are served by the significant strategic and military advantages gained—access to the Pacific and a defensive screen for the Soviet Far East—by possession of the entire chain. Japan, in contrast, has little leverage to use to budge the USSR from its status quo position, although it hopes that economic and technological incentives might tempt Moscow to consider some territorial concessions.

Border Treaties and Key Dates

1711-70

Russians explore and map Kurils.

1754

Japanese merchant establishes basho (trading place) on Kunashiri.

1785-98

Japanese exploration (mainly to determine Russian presence) of southern Kurils.

1855

Treaty of Shimoda divides Kurils; southern islands to Japan and central and northern islands to Russia.

1875

Treaty of St. Petersburg exchanges Japanese "joint occupation" of Sakhalin for Japan's ownership of entire Kurils chain.

1905

Treaty of Portsmouth ends Russo-Japanese War; Japan acquires southern Sakhalin (south of 50°N)

1945

At Yalta Conference, United States agrees to Stalin's demand that Kurils be returned; Soviet forces occupy all of the islands in late August 1945.

1951

Japanese Peace Treaty (USSR nonsignatory) in which Japan renounces all claims to Kurils.

1956

Japan and USSR sign joint declaration ending state of war and providing transfer of Shikotan and Habomai Islands to Japan on conclusion of a peace treaty.

1973

Japan's Prime Minister Tanaka and Soviet leader Brezhnev meet in Moscow; joint communique states that settling "unsolved problems" remaining since 1945 would contribute to conclusion of peace treaty.

1978

Periodic discussions over peace treaty break off because of Soviet refusal to consider territorial issue.

1986

Soviet Foreign Minister visits Japan in January and clears way for renewed peace treaty discussions;
Japanese Foreign Minister returns visit in May.

1988

Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone visits Moscow, but discussions with Secretary Gorbachev do not lead to progress on the Northern Territories.

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
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South	China	Sea	Islands	

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South China Sea Islands

Border Basics

In the South China Sea numerous small islands. islets, and reefs extending south from about the 17th parallel are variously claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.^a Most of the islands are grouped within the Paracels or the Spratlys. The Paracels are made up of 16 islands and islets, plus reefs, divided into two relatively compact groups—the Crescent and Amphitrite Groups—situated about 80 kilometers from one another. The Spratlys comprise at least 33 islands, islets, and reefs and extend over a much greater area measuring about 500 kilometers from northeast to southwest, and about 400 kilometers east to west. Additional islets and reefs extend south of what is usually termed the Spratlys to near the Sabah (Malaysia) coast. The total number of islands in the Paracels and Spratlys is considerably larger if all the reefs, cays, and other bits of rock exposed at low tide are included.

^a This discussion focuses on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the background and basis for rival claims. Maritime claims—how the surrounding sea and seabed will be divided—depend on legal ownership of the islands and are not discussed.

All of the islands are low, flat, and very small. The largest island (Woody Island, Paracels) is about 3 square kilometers in area. At high tide, the total land area of the Spratlys is probably less than 5 square kilometers. Physically, the islands consist of coral limestone overlaid with sand. On some islands, large deposits of guano are or were present. Most islands are surrounded by shoals and reefs, some of which are barren or consist of sand; others have narrow beaches backed by grass and low scrub. Only a few are large enough to support trees. Fresh water supplies are meager, and nearly all food and water has to be shipped to the islands or flown in.

The large number of reefs and shoals, coupled with strong tidal currents, make navigation hazardous in the South China Sea for those who fail to use the main shipping channels. Part of the Spratly Islands area is still labeled dangerous ground on current hydrographic charts. Despite the hazards, anchorages for small vessels are available on many of the islands. The lack of food and water, coupled with the small size of the islands, has prevented growth of indigenous populations.

Significant Developments

After China occupied the Paracels in 1974, the remaining unoccupied islands in the Spratlys were seized and fortified, primarily by Vietnam and the Philippines. Malaysia's occupation in June 1983 of Swallow Reef (Malay: Terumbu Layang Layang) appears to have started a new cycle of island seizure in the South China Sea. In March 1988, island grabbing by China and Vietnam escalated into armed conflict. Some of the islands are merely platforms built atop coral reefs; only a few are large enough to support runways. Probably none of the islands possess the resources to support the personnel that live on them.

Frontier History

The South China Sea islands have no record of permanent occupation. Chinese and Vietnamese fishermen for many centuries periodically used some of the islands; a few were probably occasionally visited by Malay and Filipino fishermen as well. Temporary quarters were set up for fishing the surrounding waters or gathering turtles and other marine life found in the lagoons and around the islands. No conclusive evidence exists as to the relative strength of Chinese and Vietnamese claims, or those of other nations, based on history or temporary occupation.

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
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
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49

The Paracel Islands







25X

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The discovery of guano deposits on the islands increased interest during the late 19th and early 20th century. Japan worked guano deposits in the Paracels during the 1920s. France claimed the Paracels (1931) and Spratlys (1933), built a lighthouse on Pattle Island (1937), and visited and established a presence on other islands during this period. Japan forced France to withdraw (1939) and during World War II made minor military use of the islands. Japan's claims were specifically renounced by terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty (1951).

China's claim to all of the South China Sea islands, originally made in 1909, was renewed in 1947. At that time garrisons were dispatched to man Itu Aba (Spratlys) and Woody Island (Paracels); the forces were withdrawn in 1950. At the time of the Japanese Peace Treaty (1951), China renewed its claim and a similar claim was made by a spokesman for the Vietnamese delegation that attended the peace conference. Renewed activity took place following the Geneva Conference (1954) and French withdrawal from Indochina. China reoccupied Woody Island, and a de facto division of the Paracels was made with South Vietnam controlling the southwestern islands (the Crescent Group) and China controlling the northeastern islands (the Amphitrites). Taiwan decided to reoccupy Itu Aba (1956), and in that year Thomas Cloma, a Philippine citizen, claimed most of the Spratlys, terming the area "Kalayaan (Freedom Land)." South Vietnam also claimed the Spratlys and sent various missions to many of the islets over the years, although a permanent garrison was established only on Spratly Island itself, located at the extreme southwestern corner of the island group.

After the release of geophysical data in 1970 that suggested sizable petroleum deposits in parts of the South China Sea, the implications of island ownership became of much greater economic significance. During the 1970s almost all bits of land capable of occupation were seized and some form of permanent installation constructed. During the decade China forcibly ejected South Vietnamese troops from the Paracels (January 1974); South Vietnam moved to occupy (later replaced by forces from Hanoi) additional islands in the Spratlys; and the Philippines occupied several islands in the northeastern Spratlys and in

1978 officially claimed the islands, citing the principle of *res nullius* (unoccupied land). In 1983 Malaysian forces took over tiny Swallow Reef, and in 1986 occupied Mariveles and Ardasier Reefs.

Tensions escalated in the Spratlys in May 1987 when China established its first outpost—on Fiery Cross Reef—and conducted an extensive naval exercise in the region. China's seizure of a second island and further naval activity in early 1988 prompted a war of words with Hanoi that escalated into an armed confrontation at Chigua Reef on 14 March, in which China sank at least one Vietnamese freighter. Subsequently both sides seized additional islands.

The present (November 1988) situation in terms of claims and island occupation is as follows:

- The Paracels are claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam; China occupies the major islands.
- China and Taiwan also claim the Spratlys, including other islets and reefs south to near Malaysia;
 China occupies six islands; Taiwan occupies Itu Aba.
- Vietnam claims all of the Spratlys and occupies up to 22 islands.
- The Philippines claims that part of the Spratlys within the polygonal-shaped "Kalayaan" area; it occupies eight islands.
- Malaysia claims the southernmost part of the Spratlys as part of its continental shelf claim; it occupies three islands.

There may be other reefs or cays that are claimed and periodically visited by the Vietnamese and Filipinos.

Current Developments and Outlook

The primary obstacle to a resolution of the multinational dispute remains the prospect of oil and gas resources, which are particularly important to Vietnam and the Philippines because they lack significant petroleum resources. Future exploitation of any petroleum resources by claimant states depends on legal ownership of the islands and the subsequent division of the surrounding seas.

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51

The obstacles to a legal division and resolution of ownership claims are great. This is particularly true for most of the Spratlys, where claims of four nations overlap. China is a key player in the dispute because Beijing claims all of the territory. Taiwan does too, but its political leverage is slight. Progress toward a settlement is unlikely until there is an improvement in Chinese-Vietnamese relations and a willingness to resolve their land boundary differences and the even more contentious issue over division of the Gulf of Tonkin. The Philippines' claim rests on the principle that the islands were unoccupied at the time of the claim and thus belong to the nation that settles them. In April 1988, however, Manila and Beijing agreed to shelve their dispute indefinitely. No party is likely to withdraw its troops from the Spratlys, and tensions will almost certainly remain high between China and Vietnam. More island grabbing is probable, and further armed confrontations are probable.

Border Treaties and Key Dates 1909

Chinese claim to South China Sea islands is reported.

1920-29

Japanese company extracts guano from Paracels.

1931

France claims Paracel islands.

1933

France claims Spratly islands.

1937

France constructs lighthouse on Pattle Island (Paracels) and visits some of the islands.

1939

Japan claims islands; forces the French to withdraw.

1939-45

Japan claims islands and uses a few of them for information gathering, meterological observation, and submarine bases.

1946-47

China renews claim; sends garrison to Itu Aba and Woody Island. Both garrisons are withdrawn in 1950.

1951

Japan renounces claims in Japanese Peace Treaty; China reiterates claim and Vietnamese delegation to conference also claims islands.

1954

France withdraws from Vietnam.

1955

France publishes aide memoire purporting to show Vietnamese ownership of islands dating to 18th century.

1956

Taiwan reoccupies Itu Aba; Thomas Cloma, Filipino citizen, proclaims "Kalayaan" as "Freedom Land." China and South Vietnam send groups to Paracels (China to Amphitrite Group; Vietnam to Crescent Group).

1970-73

The Philippines occupies and fortifies many of its claimed islands.

1974

China drives South Vietnamese forces from the Paracels. South Vietnam occupies several islands in the Spratlys. Manila sends notes to Taipei and Saigon claiming "Kalayaan" area of the Spratlys.

1976

The Philippines begins drilling for oil in Reed Tablemount area. Five wells are dug, all are dry. Vietnam and China renew their claims.

1978

Incorporation of "Kalayaan" into Palawan Province. President Marcos says Manila and Beijing have agreed to settle claims peacefully (no further information on this). Taiwan renews its claim.

1979

Vietnam constructs airfield on Spratly Island (not claimed by Manila), issues book "proving" Hanoi's

25**X**1

52

	1980 Malaysia protests Philippine occupation of Commodore Reef.	1988 January-February China establishes second garrison on Cuarteron Reef.	
	1002		25 X 1
	1982 Philippine Prime Minister Virata visits Thitu Island; China and Vietnam protest.	20 February Vietnam denounces new Chinese naval patrols in the Spratlys.	25 X 1
	Taiwan reiterates claim. China naval training cruise visits James Shoal, referred to by Beijing as "China's southernmost part." Vietnam condemns Chinese activities. Malaysia occupies Swallow Reef.	22 February China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs warns Vietnam that it "must accept full responsibility for all the consequences of obstructing China's activities" in the Spratlys.	25X1
,	1984 Chinese send several warships to the Spratlys (in May) on apparent reconnaissance mission. Vietnam and Soviet Union believe China is about to launch an	24 February Taiwan denounces Kuala Lumpur, restates its claim.	25 X 1
	assault on Vietnamese-held islands. Chinese task		
	force returns without incident.	26 February Vietnam and China reiterate their claims.	25 X 1
	Spratly Chronology, 1985 to Date	5 March	25X1
	1986 Malaysia establishes garrisons on manmade islands atop Mariveles and Ardasier Reefs.	Vietnam claims China has seized a third island, demands immediate withdrawal of PRC forces from the Spratlys.	25X1 25X1
	1987 February Vietnam constructs an outpost on Barque Canada Reef to counter Malaysia's actions.	14 March China occupies Chigua Reef. A firefight erupts when Vietnamese troops attempt to remove the Chinese forces. Chinese warships sink at least one nearby	
	March China issues statement indicating that Vietnam will "reap what it has sown" if it does not withdraw from	Vietnamese freighter, set two other ships ablaze. Casualties are reported on both sides; China takes nine prisoners. Hanoi quickly sends word that it does not want to widen the conflict; Beijing responds in kind.	25X1 25X1
	the Spratlys.	Killet.	25 X 1
	May Major Chinese naval exercise in Spratlys escalates tensions. China establishes its first outpost in the Spratlys, a small garrison atop Fiery Cross Reef. July-October China announces possible major oil find south of	March-April Island grabbing and war of words between China and Vietnam continues. By mid-April China has seized up to two more islands, Vietnam as many as six. Vietnam offers to negotiate sovereignty issue; China informs UN Security Council it will discuss Spratlys only after Vietnam withdraws from Cambodia. Moscow keeps its distance, urges peaceful settlement.	25X1
	Spratlys, acknowledges conducting oceanographic re-		051/4
	search in the region since 1984, denies political	•	25 X 1
	motive.		25 X 1

53

25X1

25**X**1

25X1

25X1 25X1

April aiwan puts its Spratly forces on "double alert," but ders them to avoid disputed areas unless attacked.				
13 April China incorporates Spratlys and Paracels into Province. Move denounced by Vietnam.	o Hainan			
16 April Philippine President Corazon Aquino announces tha she and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping have agreed t shelve their Spratly dispute indefinitely.				
29 November The Philippines and Vietnam agree to work t peaceful resolution of the Spratly conflict.	oward			

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Boundaries and
Territorial Disputes

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Other Asian Boundaries and Territorial Disputes

The design of this report permits updating of border information.

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Other Asian Boundaries and Territorial Disputes

Almost all of the remaining Eurasian international boundaries have been demarcated and major disputes resolved. In Asia, boundaries that were delimited through administrative decrees during the days of colonial rule, for the most part, have been updated through new agreements, modern mapping surveys, and redemarcation. A number of disputes, some major and others minor, that China had with its neighbors were settled in the early 1960s through treaties and the subsequent work of joint border commissions that demarcated the boundary.


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The accompanying table lists boundary status (demarcated or delimited); pertinent boundary treaties and agreements; explanatory notes for some boundaries for past or current problems; and, where available, the *International Boundary Studies* (IBS) prepared by the Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. For convenience, Asian and European boundaries are listed separately.

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
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
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
59



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Boundary Length (kilometers) Cambodia-Thailand 803

Status:


Delimited; parts demarcated Treaty: France-Siam Treaty (March 1907);

demarcation 1907-09

IBS:

No. 40 (revised), November 1966

Note: A dispute over the location of a temple was settled in Cambodia's favor (1962) by the ICJ. Since 1975 occasional border incidents related more to refugees and warfare inside Cambodia than to border alignment. Several minor discrepancies in the alignment are caused by missing border posts and differences between modern maps and original treaty maps.



Cambodia-Vietnam 1,228

Status: Treaty:

Delimited


Cambodia-Vietnam Treaty (July 1983) on "principles for settlement of border


problems" and "border status"

IBS:

No. 155, March 1976. (Reflects border status prior to 1983 agreement)

Note: Several small border areas were disputed and a source of friction between Cambodia and Vietnam at the time of Hanoi's invasion (December 1978) and subsequent occupation of Cambodia. The pre-1978 alignment was based on treaties and administrative decrees during the French colonial era; some sections of the boundary had been demarcated. The 1983 agreement states that the border alignment is based on French topographic maps dated 1954 or earlier, and thus favors Vietnam's view of the alignment at the expense of Cambodia. Cambodian dissident groups denounced the agreement and reiterated charges of Vietnamese movement of border posts.





120 Kilometers

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67

Boundary Length (kilometers) China-Hong Kong (United Kingdom) 30 (Land) 220 (Sea)

Status:

Delimited Treaty:

Convention between China and Great

Britain (August 1898); boundary delimitation agreement (March 1899)

No. 13, April 1962 IBS:

Note: By terms of a Sino-British joint declaration (September 1984), sovereignty over the British Crown Colony reverts to China on I July 1997. About 90 percent of the colony had been leased to Great Britain by terms of the 1898 convention between the two powers. According to the 1984 agreement, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is to be set up that is to maintain Hong Kong's "capitalist system and lifestyle" for 50 years.




China-Laos 423

Status: Demarcated

Treaty: Convention between China and France

(June 1887)

IBS: No. 34, June 1964



0.34

China-Macau (Portugal)

Demarcated


China provided the territory to Portu-Treaty:


gal in 1557. In the restoration of relations between China and Portugal (1979), Macau is described as "Chinese territory under Portuguese administra-


tion."


IBS: None

Note: By terms of a Sino-Portuguese joint declaration (April 1987), sovereignty over the Portuguese colony reverts to China on 20 December 1999. According to the 1987 agreement, Macau will become a Special Administrative Region of China for 50 years, guaranteed a "high level" of autonomy except in defense and foreign affairs.










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
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
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69





73



Railroad Boundary Length International boundary Road (kilometers) Other international boundary Laos-Thailand 1,754 Status: Boundary follows Mekong River (966 kilometers) and demarcated by thalweg where no river islands exist; where islands are present boundary follows thalweg nearest Thai shore. Islands belong to Laos, however, unless specifically allocated to Thailand by a 1926 treaty. Land boundary delimited using water divides; markers reportedly placed between 1905 and 1907. Treaty: Convention between France and Siam (February 1904) and agreement modified parts of the treaty (June 1904); France-Thailand settlement (May 1946) restored status quo ante, a reference to territory west of the Mekong transferred to Thailand (1941-45) during Japanese occupation IBS: No. 20, September 1962 Noni Note: In June 1984, Thai troops occupied three small hamlets whose location relative to the boundary is in dispute. In this area the boundary follows local water divides in rough, mountainous terrain. Alleged Lao harassment of Thai road construction near border preceded incident. Thai troops were withdrawn in late 1984. Until the boundary is redemarcated, incidents over the precise boundary location are likely to occur. In September 1987 fighting broke out between Laos and Thailand over Laotian occupancy of New Mu territory that Thailand considers to be part of its Phitsanulok Sisaket Province. A cease-fire was negotiated, which went into effect 19 February 1988, and in November 1988 the two countries agreed to establish a joint border committee to resolve the more than 40 areas under dispute. The two countries disagree over which headwater branch of the Nam Heung River the boundary follows in connecting with the Mekong-Menam watershed between Tha Li and Phoun Thêrig Uttaradit. Bangkok MBODIA Gulf Scale 1:8,200,000 100 150 Kilometers Thailand 100 150 Miles Laos-Vietnam 2,130 Status: Demarcated Treaty: Original delimitations based on French administrative decrees; a treaty of Delimitation of National Boundaries (July 1978) used French documents with minor adjustments and provided for demarcation (1978-80). Additional Gulf of Tonkin adjustments made (January 1986) transferring two small areas to Vietnam Dong Hoi IBS: No. 35 (revised), June 1966, but updat-South ed by 1978 and 1986 agreement China

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77

300 Miles

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25X1

25X1

Sea

800951 (A06042) 9-88

300 Kilometers

Scale 1:16,000,000

200

Boundary Length Railroad International boundary Road (kilometers) Other international boundary Malaysia-Philippines Territorial dispute Status: Busuanga Treaty: Treaty in 1878 and subsequent agree-Coron ments between Sultan of Sulu trans-Calamian ferred rights to North Borneo to Brit-Group ish company IBS: None Note: The Philippines claimed Sabah (1962) on the eve of Malay-South China Roxas sian independence, disputing intent of the 1878 treaty and other agreements that transferred the territory. Article I of the 1973 Puerto Princes SeaCagayan Constitution incorporated wording intended to cover the pending Palawan claim: "all the other territories belonging to the Philippines by Quezo historic right or legal title." Discussions commenced in 1977 for an Malabuñgan agreement that, in exchange for Manila dropping the Sabah claim, PHILIPPINES joint border patrols would be established to halt smuggling and Bugsuk Island support for Muslim insurgents in southern Philippines. The issue Sulu Sea was still unsettled when the commission revising the Constitution Balabac Balabac Island under Aquino in 1986 voted, after much debate, to replace the Line of separation indicating island sovereignty Strait Pulau Banggi disputed phrase with "all the other territories over which the 40 government exercises sovereign jurisdiction." At the same time the Isabela ⊖ Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi Islan commission passed a resolution that the new wording would not Pangutaran Ji Isla... Group • Jolg preclude the Philippine Government from pursuing the Sabah Basilan Island claim. President Aquino favors dropping the claim, but opposition in the Philippine Congress has stalled progress toward resolving the Tapul Group dispute. Semporna Pulau Sebatik Sea Celebes ale 1:10.000.000 200 Kilometers 100 INDONESIA Cele 100 200 Miles 800952 (A06043) 9-88 Malaysia-Singapore 56 Status: Delimited Straits settlement and Johore Territo-Treaty: rial Waters Act (August 1928) decreed S that center of deepwater channel Sungai should divide mainland area from Singapore IBS: None

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79

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
INDONESIA


Singapore

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15 Kilometers





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Europe	

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25X


European Boundaries and Territorial Disputes

International boundaries in Europe, particularly those in Eastern Europe, changed frequently during the 18th and 19th centuries, but after World War I the extensive boundary realignments were based on ethnic affiliations and plebiscites. Some territorial alterations were made during World War II, but most boundaries, with the exception of those of Germany and Poland, reverted to their pre-1938 location after the peace treaties (1946-48). There were also a few minor changes in alignment, primarily involving countries bordering the USSR. All European international boundaries are mapped in great detail and usually are defined by a high number of markers per kilometer of border.


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
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


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



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






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











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





Boundary Length International boundary Railroad (kilometers) Other international boundary Road Greece-Yugoslavia Titov Vėles 22030 246 Status: Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Treaty: Serbia (June 1912); demarcation essentially completed (1913) IBS: No. 79, April 1968 Resen δ Políkasi Aridhaía Kilkí: Scale 1:2,400,000 40 Kilometers 40 Miles 800998 (A06087) 9-BB 25X1 SOVIETATION Hungary-Romania 443 Status: Demarcated Treaty of Trianon (June 1920) estab-Treaty: lished boundary commission to demarcate border. Treaty of Peace with Hungary (1947) restored boundary as of 1 January 1938 based on 1920 treaty and subsequent demarcation work IBS: No. 47, April 1965 Note: The annexation of Transylvania by Romania, legitimized by the Trianon Treaty, was opposed by irredentist groups in Hungary. About half the territory was returned to Hungary by terms of the Vienna Award (1940), then reverted to Romania in 1945. Hungary has not officially raised the issue since then. Scale 1:3,900,000 75 Miles 50 800999 (A06088) 9-88 25X1 **Hungary-USSR** 135 22.20 Status: Demarcated Treaty: Treaty of Peace between the Allied Strabichovo powers and Hungary (June 1920) de-Uzlovoye S .O tached Ruthenia from Hungary and 7 Tiszabezdéd Zvoakovoye joined it to Czechoslovakia; HungaryleO N Czechoslovakia boundary demarcated 1921-25. Treaty of Peace with Hungary (February 1947) restored the bound-Kisvárda ary to its pre-1938 location Beregsurán IBS: No. 76, April 1967 Vinograd U N.G Note: Czechoslovakia ceded Ruthenia to the USSR in the Moscow Vásárosn Tiszabecş Agreement (June 1945) creating the Hungary-USSR boundary; Szatmárcseké location confirmed by Treaty of Peace with Hungary (February 1947) Feherqyarma Baktalórántháza Mátészalk Rozsálv 20 Miles 25X1


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